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Abstract
This Essay considers the substantive and institutional aspects of an economic theory of contract regulation. It lists the various
functions that analysts have assigned to contract regulation and briefly discusses the substantive wisdom and institutional
feasibility  of  performing those functions.  The essay tentatively concludes that  the state should enforce contracts,  supply
vocabularies that are useful in writing contracts and supply default modes of economic organization, such as a corporate or
bankruptcy code. Other possible state functions, such as supplying efficient default rules for use in contracts, may be beyond the
ability of government to perform well.
Résumé
Cet essai examine ce que devrait être une théorie économique de la réglementation des contrats d'un point de vue institutionnel
ou substantiel. Il énumère les différentes fonctions que les analystes ont assignées à la réglementation des contrats et discute
brièvement l'exercice de ces fonctions sous l'angle de leur faisabilité institutionnelle et de la prudence substantielle. Cet essai
conclut,  non sans hésitation, que l'État devrait  assurer les fonctions suivantes :  faire respecter les contrats,  produire les
terminologies qui sont utiles à la rédaction des contrats, produire les règles de défaillance de l'activité économique comme celles
du droit des faillites et du droit des sociétés. D'autres fonctions possibles pour l'État, comme la production de règles efficaces de
défaillance à utiliser dans la rédaction des contrats, nous semblent bien au-delà des compétences prouvées des gouvernements.
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I. — INTRODUCTION 
Discussions of regulation commonly focus on regulating particular indust
ries, such as the airline industry, or regulating types of firms, such as natural 
monopolies. These discussions often concern the substance of the transactions 
that regulated firms make. Few regulatory discussions focus on regulating 
contracts as such. As an example of the distinction just drawn, a regulation dis
cussion may ask what terms a regulated firm can include in its contracts with 
customers ; a discussion of contract regulation may ask what terms the state 
should supply to firms to use in transactions with each other. In recent years, 
law and economics scholars have begun to add to the question which contract 
rule would be appropriate in particular cases the more abstract question regar
ding how the state should regulate contracts between business firms as a gener
al matter. Contract regulation as a distinct area for scholarly inquiry is in its 
infancy, however (1). This essay's goal is to introduce the subject and to indi
cate its importance in the hope that more detailed treatments will follow (2). 
(1) Early treatments of the topic are in Schwartz (1992a) and Tiróle (1992). Citations to more 
recent work will appear below. 
(2) Courts will not enforce contracts that create externalities, such as agreements to fix prices. 
There also is considerable regulation of contracts between firms and consumers, com
monly rested on the ground of an imbalance in sophistication and resources between these 
parties. Contracts that create externalities and consumer contracts are beyond the scope of 
this essay. 
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An economic theory of contract regulation will have a substantive and an 
institutional aspect (3). The substantive aspect asks what the state should do. 
The institutional aspect asks which legal institutions should perform the nee
ded regulatory tasks. Given the complexity of the subject and the necessary 
brevity of this essay, any conclusions respecting these aspects must be tentati
vely held. With this disclaimer and beginning with substance, the state appears 
to do four things well : enforce contracts ; police the contracting process for 
fraud and duress ; supply parties with common vocabularies to use when wri
ting contracts ; and supply parties with governance modes for the conduct of 
transactions or the resolution of disputes. It should do only these things, and 
not the additional things that it sometimes attempts. An example of such an 
additional thing is the attempt to implement an ex post fair solution in a parti
cular case when both contract and renegotiation have failed. Regarding the ins
titutional aspect of the theory, only courts can perform the first two tasks just 
listed ; only legislatures can do the last ; and the third task commonly is and 
should be shared between the legislative and adjudicatory institutions (4). 
II. — THE SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTION 
Law and economics scholars have proposed five regulatory functions for 
inter-firm contracts. 
(1.) Enforcing a contract's verifiable terms : Enforcement is specific when 
the state orders a party to perform the task or to make the transfer that the 
contract directs. Enforcement also can be by a damage sanction, as when the 
breaching party is required to pay to its contract partner the profit that the part
ner would have earned had the contract been performed. 
(2.) Supplying vocabularies : The state cannot enforce a contract unless it 
knows what the contract says. A way to know this is to supply parties with a 
stock of common meanings, and this is done in three ways. First, the state can 
(3) A competing theory of contract regulation that is pursued largely by legal scholars holds 
that the state should enact contract rules that are fair and that promote community among 
contracting parties. An extensive treatment of this theory is in Collins (1999). 
Implementing a fairness theory is difficult when parties have the freedom to alter fair legal 
rules that do not maximize their expected gains. This point is developed in a little more 
depth in Part 3B below. 
(4) Private associations often create rules to regulate transactions among the members and 
between members and outside parties. These rules have the legal status of contracts made 
among an association's membership. The question whether courts should treat these 
contracts as they do ordinary market contracts is unsettled in the law and among comm
entators, but there is a tendency for courts to enforce the contracts as written when the 
rules are clear. An interesting study of the contrast between the adjudicatory practices of 
courts and the adjudicatory practices of the institutions that private associations create is 
Bernstein (1996). 
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restrict parties to the dictionary meanings of the words they use, unless a 
contract at issue explicitly defines a commonly used word in an idiosyncratic 
manner. Second, a court when deciding cases or a statute can define commonl
y used words or phrases in the customary way. For example, the phrase « FOB 
Seller's place of business » has long meant that the buyer is to bear the expens
e and risk of transporting the goods once the seller delivers them to the carr
ier. Commercial statutes now define the FOB phrase in this way. As a conse
quence, if a contract uses the FOB phrase and the goods are damaged or des
troyed while in transit, the seller is entitled to the price and the buyer bears the 
loss. Third, the state can adopt for purposes of adjudication the meanings that 
private trade associations have developed (5). 
(3.) Interpreting agreements : The adjudicator asks what the parties to the 
contract before it meant by the words they used. It is the particular meaning 
that controls. If particular parties meant by the phrase « FOB Seller's place of 
business » that the buyer was to bear the expense of shipping the goods, but 
not the risk of their damage in transit, then on this interpretative theory if the 
goods were damaged, the seller could not recover the price unless it shipped 
new goods. 
(4.) Supplying default rules : The three principal types of default rules are 
(6): 
A. « Problem solving » default rules : The state supplies parties with rules 
that maximize expected surplus. Awarding a party the gain it would have made 
under the contract had the other party performed is efficient with respect to the 
decision whether to breach the contract or to perform it. Hence, a legal rule 
that awards the gain if the contract is silent maximizes expected surplus, at 
least with respect to the breach decision. 
B. Information forcing default rules : The state supplies rules that seldom 
would be optimal for the party with private information. The effort of this 
party to contract out, it is hoped, will reveal information that is needed for effi
cient trade or investment. For example, suppose that one party can increase the 
probability of a successful performance by increasing the amount of effort it 
commits. This party could not choose the optimal effort level if it is uninfor
med as to the value that a successful performance would have. In this circums
tance, a legal rule that would award the passive but informed party no reme
dy if performance turned out to be unsuccessful may induce this party to dis
close its valuation, thereby facilitating the taking of efficient precautions by 
the uninformed performing party. See Bebchuk and Shavell (1999). 
(5) There are fewer such generally accepted, privately created meanings than had been sup
posed. See Bernstein (1999). 
(6) A complete taxonomy of default rule types is found in Schwartz (1994). 
REVUE D'ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n° 92, 2' et 3e trimestres 2000 1 03 
C. Fair default rules : The state supplies parties with rules that are fair accor
ding to some normative conception. To illustrate, courts and commentators 
often think that it is fair for the seller to supply conforming goods when the 
buyer has paid a nontrivial price. The law generally implies a warranty - the 
seller must compensate the buyer if the goods are defective - and this is some
times said to follow from the law's commitment to fairness. 
(5.) Regulating the contracting process : This function has several aspects : 
A. Not enforcing contracts that were procured by fraud, such as misrepre
senting the quality of a performance that is to be rendered. 
B. Not enforcing modifications to contracts that were procured by exploiting 
sunk cost investment. 
C. Implementing the ex post efficient solution. As an example, when ci
rcumstances have materially changed between the time the contract was made 
and is to be performed, such that enforcement would benefit one of the parties 
but make society worse off on net, commentators urge courts not to enforce, 
and some courts heed this advice. 
D. Implementing the ex post fair solution. Continuing with the example, if 
performance would give one party a windfall gain, commentators urge courts 
to reduce the gain to a fair level, and courts occasionally attempt to do this. 
III. — THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF CONTRACT REGULATION 
A. What is possible ? 
In common law countries, courts today perform all five regulatory functions. 
The contract parts of Civil Law Codes tend to be written on a fairly high level 
of abstraction because the Codes regulate many different transaction types. 
This confers considerable discretion on courts, and it would be interesting to 
test the hypothesis that courts in Civil Law countries also perform these five 
functions. In any event, legislatures cannot perform functions (1.) - enforce
ment - (3.) - interpreting agreements - and much of (5.) - regulating the 
contracting process - because these are adjudicatory functions. To enforce a 
contract (function (1.)) or to find what particular parties meant by the words 
they used (function (3.)) require case by case inquiries. Legislatures supply 
rules. Function (2.), the supplying of contracting vocabularies, is shared be
tween courts and legislatures. A statute cannot define every word or phrase that 
parties into the indefinite future may use in the contracts they will write. 
Courts on the other hand must give legal effect to the words in a contract ; and 
the definitions they develop in the course of doing this often are held to speci
fy the legally operative meanings when the same words appear in later 
contracts. Hence, courts necessarily play a residual role in supplying contrac - 
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ting vocabularies, even when the legislature has enacted a vocabulary itself 
(7). The policing function (function (5.)) also can be shared. For example, the 
legislature can direct courts to ignore windfalls when deciding cases or it can 
create standards by which courts must assess whether fraud has been committ
ed. Legislatures seldom seem to perform these tasks, so the policing function 
(5.) is today performed exclusively by courts. 
This is not to say that courts can perform every aspect of this function well. 
Thus, a court seldom would have the information to implement the ex post 
efficient solution (function 5(C)). This is because courts receive information 
only from the parties. If parties are symmetrically informed ex post, however, 
they will bargain to the efficient solution, so that courts will not see the case. 
If courts see only cases in which information is asymmetric, then they will lack 
the information to implement the efficient solution. As an illustration, let it be 
efficient to breach a particular contract because the seller's cost to perform 
would exceed the buyer's valuation, but suppose that the seller's cost is nei
ther observable nor verifiable. The parties, suppose, cannot agree on a price for 
breach, the seller refuses to perform and the buyer sues. The court cannot 
know whether breach would be efficient or not ; and since the seller's refusal 
to perform is itself verifiable, the court can only enforce the contract (8). 
A court also could not perform function 5(D), implementing the ex post fair solu
tion, because courts act subject to the institutional constraint that they decide accor
ding either to pre-existing legal or moral principles. Any division of ex post gains 
between two business firms would be arbitrary ; that is, there is no legal or distr
ibutional principle that would permit a court to decide whether it is fair to give the 
plaintiff or the defendant particular shares. Since legislatures cannot perform func
tions 5(C) and (D) - implementing ex post efficient or fair solutions - these func
tions should not be performed for institutional reasons ; that is, the limited compet
encies of legal institutions imply that the state should not alter the performances 
that contracts require to achieve either ex post efficiency or ex post fairness. 
Before asking which of the remaining regulatory functions should be per
formed and by whom, it is worth noting that the two interpretative functions 
(7) As an illustration, the American Uniform Commercial Code creates a set of default rules 
to regulate sales transactions. These rules use terms that are derived from commercial 
practice, but the Code defines them explicitly. Hence, parties who today use a statutorily 
defined term are held to intend the statutory meaning. The original Code's list of terms is 
not exhaustive, however, so courts are continually defining new terms, some of which 
have been incorporated into Code revisions. This process continues. 
(8) In addition to this theoretical difficulty, parties seldom would want a court to implement 
an ex post efficient solution in the rare cases when it could because commercial agents 
need prompt answers. Litigations take a long time, so that any otherwise efficient solution 
usually would be outmoded before it could be devised. Perhaps for the reasons given in 
text and in this note, courts seldom attempt to implement ex post efficient outcomes. There 
are examples of these attempts in connection with long term contracts. 
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sometimes will be inconsistent. Parties will be less inclined to use judicially or 
statutorily defined phrases if courts will permit a party who turns out to suffer 
from a rigid application of a definition to introduce evidence that in pre
contract conversations the parties indicated that a rigid application was not 
their intention. Rather, parties will more frequently themselves define the 
words they use in the contracts they write, an effort that is more costly but 
more predictable than relying on preexisting but malleable definitions. On the 
other hand, a rigid application of pre-existing definitions may impose obliga
tions that some parties did not intend to assume. Thus, there is a tension be
tween the « vocabulary supplying » (2.) and the « meaning finding » (3.) 
contract interpretation functions. See Scott (2000). 
B. What is desirable ? 
The virtues of contract enforcement need not be stressed but there is a point 
to be made about enforcement modes. A contract can be « enforced » by awar
ding damages to the injured party or by specifically enforcing the actions that 
the contract requires. Solutions to the problem of inducing efficient relation 
specific investment commonly involve the use of contracts that condition on 
verifiable subsets of information, and that require specific enforcement of the 
transfers that the contracts direct (9). A practical objection to these solutions is 
that contract enforcement takes time, but subject to this difficulty European 
laws that make specific performance relatively easy to get are preferable to 
common law rules that make it difficult. Also, the desirability of preventing 
fraud and exploitation (functions 5 (A) and (B)) is obvious. 
Turning to functions (2.) and (3.), the vocabulary supplying function is non- 
controversial when it is stated in isolation, but becomes controversial when the 
tension between it and the interpreting agreements function of (3.) is made explic
it. This is because the two functions partly derive from distinct normative goals. 
The vocabulary supplying function is efficient. Providing a contractual vocabula
ry is a public good. When parties have a common vocabulary, they can know what 
they are agreeing to and what will be enforced. The costs of supplying standardi
zed contract terms will often exceed the gains for particular contracting parties. 
Also, a party who would be disappointed in the deal if it were enforced has an 
incentive to cheat ex post, by claiming that the parties made a different deal - that 
they intended the words they used to have a meaning particular to them. In sum, 
private parties will create suboptimal sets of vocabularies, and a common contrac
tual vocabulary could not survive unless it was made mandatory by judicial enfor
cement of the statutory or case created meanings. 
The meaning finding function of interpretation follows from autonomy 
norms. Under these norms, a person cannot be made to take, or to be preven- 
(9) For a review, see Schwartz (1998). 
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ted from taking, lawful actions without his informed, voluntary consent. 
Hence, when a contract is sought to be enforced against a person, that person 
must be permitted to offer evidence as to the actual meaning that the parties 
intended the contract's words to have. Evidence relevant to this question can 
be found in what was said and done before the contract was made, from the 
customs of the industry or trade in which the parties exist, and from any 
conduct ex post that can shed light on what the written words meant to the 
people who actually used them. When a court permits such evidence to be 
introduced, it is said to engage in contextual interpretation, and when a court 
refuses to consider such evidence in favor of applying standard meanings in 
standard ways, it is said to engage in acontextual interpretation. Courts in the 
United States vacillate between these two modes of interpretation, but it is dif
ficult to discern a principle underlying the decisions (10). 
Resolving the conflict between the vocabulary supplying function (2.) and 
the interpreting agreements function (3.) is beyond the scope of a short essay 
such as this, but a remark is in order. Autonomy norms are strongest when a 
contract is sought to be enforced against an individual, and lose force as the 
defendants become companies. Hence, a normative theory of contract regula
tion whose subject is transactions among firms should prefer courts to aban
don function (3.) in favor of function (2.). A less definitive solution is to let 
adjudicatory methods be default rules, so that courts which are using acontext
ual interpretation would switch to a more literal enforcement mode when the 
parties' contract so requested (11). It is unclear how this suggestion would 
work in practice. 
Function 3(C) - supplying fair default rules - arguably should not be perfo
rmed by any state institution. This is because the set of surplus maximizing rules 
and the set of fair rules, by any normative criterion, likely are disjoint. Business 
parties will contract out of « fair but inefficient » default rules. As a consequenc
e, while a decision maker may want to resolve choices among legal rules by 
fairness norms when all of the feasible rules are on the pareto frontier, the sup
plying of fair default rules independently of their efficiency can be wasted effort 
for the rule creators and will impose unnecessary contracting costs on parties. 
The remaining functions to consider are 5(B) and (C), supplying parties with 
problem solving and information forcing default rules. The problem solving task 
can be divided into two subfunctions : (a) Providing modes of governance, such 
as a corporate form or a bankruptcy scheme ; (b) Solving particular problems, 
such as the scope of the seller's obligation to supply product quality. The rational
e for providing both functions is the same : supplying a governance mode or a 
solution to a complex but commonly recurring problem will often cost particular 
(10) For a discussion, see Posner (1998). 
(11) This is suggested in Bernstein (1996). 
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parties more than the gains that the mode or form could yield to them. A court 
could not supply a governance mode because courts exist to decide disputes, not 
create business regulating codes. In addition, parties to a litigation will supply 
courts with information that may help to win a case, but will not supply informat
ion ecessary to create an entire governance mode. Courts sometimes can supply 
rules to solve more particular problems. Thus, courts never but legislatures can 
and sometimes do supply parties with default governance modes, and both insti
tutions sometimes attempt to solve particular problems. 
The public goods aspect of supplying solutions to problems implies that pro
blem solving default rules should be created, but there is a distinction between 
supplying governance modes or dispute resolution schemes and the solving of 
particular problems. The former sets of solutions can be highly general, and 
applicable to a wide range of commercial behaviors. Thus, many different types 
of business activity can be conducted in the corporate form. In contrast, attemp
ting to solve particular problems will often founder on the heterogeneity of 
large, modern economies. The state creates rules either through adjudication, 
which is expensive and time consuming, or by legislation, which also is costly 
and takes time. Consequently, state solutions to problems will not be cost justi
fied unless the problems can be approached in a general way. Though commerc
ial problems often are general - how to induce efficient sunk cost investment, 
for example - the solutions to these problems usually are specific. Contracts that 
may induce efficient investment thus condition on verifiable sets of information 
related to the costs and valuations of the parties to these contracts, and require 
transfers that are efficacious only in connection with these particular costs and 
valuations. See, e.g., Maskin and Tiróle (1999) ; Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) ; 
Hermalin and Katz (1993). Hence, a set of state supplied default rules that 
attempted to induce efficient investment likely would approach in size the set of 
private contracts. This would not reduce social costs. 
The disjunction between the need for state supplied default rules to be gener
al in form and the need for particularist solutions to commercial problems has 
led to dramatic legislative failures. As an example, the Uniform Commercial 
Code provides that, when the contract is silent, sellers assume all risks asso
ciated with product quality, as a consequence of which the sellers must pay 
compensation for any loss a buyer suffers from a noncompliant product. 
Sellers of products that may cause substantial losses, especially when the pro
ducts are complex, always contract out of this default rule. The sellers then 
specify the precise quality obligation and damage risk they are willing to assu
me, and these specifications differ across products. Thus, the Code warranty 
sections impose contracting costs that are large in the aggregate but create no 
offsetting benefits. This story can be retold for other rules, and its lesson is that 
there are few commercial problems whose solutions are sufficiently general to 
justify the supply of problem solving default rules by the state. 
To the difficulty of heterogeneity must be added the related difficulty of 
asymmetric information. Parties will contract out of default rules that condi- 
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tion on unvenfiable information because such rules would produce moral 
hazard. The pervasiveness of the verifiability problem thus seriously 
constrains the regulatory function of supplying default rules to commercial 
parties. And in sum, the related difficulties of heterogeneity and asymmetric 
information suggest that legislatures seldom should attempt to create contract 
law rules that have the purpose of maximizing surplus for parties who accept 
those rules (12). These two difficulties do not plague to the same degree the 
function of creating default modes of economic organization, such as the stan
dard partnership or business corporation. 
The function of supplying information forcing default rules (4(C)) also suf
fers from the difficulties of heterogeneity and asymmetric information. The 
goal here is to supply rules that will induce separating equilibria, but it will be 
difficult for courts or legislatures to obtain the knowledge needed for inducing 
separation when the economic actors function in highly heterogenous econo
mies, and there is considerable private information. See Adler (1999). 
Analyses of third degree price discrimination also suggest that separating 
agents is a context specific task. While the issue is still under debate, one 
conclusion is clear : writing useful problem solving or information forcing 
default rules is a harder task than was originally thought. 
IV. — CONCLUSION 
Jean Tiróle has written : « The challenge for the economist is to develop a 
theory of the optimal judiciary scope of intervention (the class of problems 
over which the courts have discretion) and instruments (the menu of choices 
they face) ». The need actually is broader than this - to develop a theory of 
what the state in general should do regarding contracts and then to specify 
which legal institutions should perform which substantively desirable func
tions. This essay has sketched the possible functions the state can perform and 
made a few preliminary remarks about which of these functions are possible 
and desirable to perform. Courts can and should enforce the verifiable terms 
of contracts, police the contracting process to deter fraud and duress, and help 
to supply firms with a common vocabulary to use when making contracts. 
Legislatures should also supply vocabularies and create default modes of eco
nomic organization. At this early stage in our understanding of these issues, 
these are the most defensible tasks and institutional roles that it is possible to 
do and to play. 
(12) Courts recognize these difficulties implicitly, and tend in asymmetric information envi
ronments to enforce only those terms that condition on verifiable information ; they do not 
try to create new rules. See Schwartz (1992b). 
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Many additional topics remain to be explored. These include whether parties 
should be permitted to choose the interpretative practices that courts will apply 
to their agreements ; whether courts should emulate the contracting practices 
of private associations ; whether contextual interpretation helps parties to 
solve their own problems or hinders parties ; and the appropriate level of gener
ality that legal default rules should take. Contract theory regulation thus has 
an interesting research program. 
REFERENCES 
ADLER, BARRY E. « The Questionable Assent of Hadley v. Baxendale », 51 Stanford Law 
Review 1547-89 (1999). 
BEBCHUK, Lucían AYRE and Steven SHAVELL. « Reconsidering Contractual Liability and 
the Incentive to Reveal Information », 51 Stanford Law Review 1615 (1999). 
BERNSTEIN, Lisa. « The Questionable Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy : A 
Preliminary Study », University of Chicago Law School Law and Economics Working 
Paper (2nd Series) No. 74 (1999). 
, « Merchant Law In a Merchant Court : Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent 
Business Norms », 144 Pennsylvania Law Review 1766-1821 (1996). 
COLLINS, Hugh, « Regulating Contracts » (Oxford University Press, London 1999). 
EDLIN, AARON S. and Stefan REICHELSTEIN. « Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and 
Optimal Investment », 86 American Economic Review 478-99 (1996). 
HERMALIN, Benjamin A. and Michael I. KATZ, « Judicial Modification of Contracts Between 
Sophisticated Parties : A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach », 
9 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 230-55 (1993). 
MASKIN, Eric and Jean TIRÓLE, « Unforseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts », 66 
Review of Economic Studies 83-114(1999). 
POSNER, Eric A., « The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of 
Contractual Interpretation », 146 Pennsylvania L. Review 533-77 (1998). 
SCHWARTZ, Alan, « Incomplete Contracts » in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law 277-83 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998). 
, « The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law », 3 Southern California 
Interdisciplinary Law Review 389-419 (1994). 
, « Legal Contract Theories and Incomplete Contracts » in Contract Economics 76-108 
(Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds. 1992a). 
Relational Contracts in the Courts : An Analysis of Incomplete Contracts and Judicial 
Strategies », 21 J. Legal Studies 271-318 (1992b). 
SCOTT, Robert E., « The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law : A Comparative Analysis of 
Common Law and Code Methodologies » forthcoming in The Jurisprudential Foundations 
of Corporate and Commercial Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
TIRÓLE, Jean, « Comments », in Contract Economics 109-13 (Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, 
eds. 1992). 
110 REVUE D'ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n° 92, 2e et 3e trimestres 2000 
